General Thoughts on Contact Tracing, best practices, rules, information to uncover

https://science.house.gov/imo/media/doc/AI_initiative_SST.pdf This is the current House of Representatives Bill on a National US AI Intiative

Some references for the ethics of contact tracing:

https://ict4peace.org/activities/a-human-centric-framework-to-evaluate-the-risks-raised-by-contact-tracing-applications/

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3582550&fbclid=IwAR0mlUgjepDdWaqv63dqN7NhesYnpqweLXYKijTA1wkdpBtuLVFnvANeUkE

Interesting to read the section called, "Only One Chance to Get It Right" in paper #2. I've been wondering about audit cadence. In this crisis, do governments only have one chance to get it right, or is it possible that they can build a solution that's close-to-perfect and they can continue to do updates and we could continue to audit them more frequently than annually?

In regards to paper #1, I think this section is relevant to Opt-In: "Though the protocols considered here are voluntary, and in the case of Apple and Google’s app not even the back-end receives information on infected individuals, it is not unlikely that, as they are deployed, workplaces and educational institutions will require their employees and students to download these apps. Similarly, it is not unlikely that these or other apps evolve into “safety passes” showing third parties that the owner of the cellphone has not been in close contact with an infected person and/or is not a carrier. In these contexts, contact-tracing apps risk increasing discrimination to individuals who decide not adopt an application or don’t have the means to. In scenarios in which governments access some form of information collected by applications - for example on who has tested positive or their geolocation - governments must be wary not to over-rely on this information, as the most vulnerable populations may not appear on the data for lack of access and lack of trust in the system. Paradoxically, this kind of policy-blindness will leave unprotected those who need protection the most."

In the Botero piece, we have to stay away from an effectiveness discussion. It is a distraction from proper governance. Let the implementation side worry about effectivenesss

Great point, @Ryan Carrier. I most definitely agree that we need to avoid discussing effectiveness, especially since it is connected so intimately to other actions in dealing with this pandemic. However, I think @Michelle Calabro is right that we should be cognizant of how effectiveness will influence the Architecture Design of Contact Tracing, and such, what Opt-In will look like in various situations. For example, even if a federal or state / provincial government mandates use of the app by law, that shouldn't relieve the responsibility of the Contact Tracing Method in allowing the user to decide where their data goes.

Yes I think this is one of the beautiful things about audit rules. One system could fail to comply with one rule and succeed in complying with many others.

There is too many words being printed on this subject. It will take an eternity to digest it all. We need to do our best to simplify and summarize. Just reading all the materials is a nightmare

https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-strengths-weaknesses/ I have contacted Andy Greenberg and invited him to join. The part that resonated with my are the privacy concerns raised, but also the participation rate issues with Singapore at only 25% one month in. Raises the question of "Will governments insist?" otherwise what is the point?

https://techcrunch.com/2020/04/20/academics-contact-tracing/ This headline is misleading. The academics, mostly french, wrote an open letter advocating for a decentralize approach. Not backing explicitly contact tracing apps as the headline alludes. I have reached out to a few.