Relaxed Majority Criterion
The majority criterion states that "if one candidate is preferred by a majority (more than 50%) of voters, then that candidate must win." This criterion is used to dismiss Score and Approval voting, which don't pass the majority criterion, as running contrary to our basic notions of democracy. Further, this MC failure is hypothesized to encourage factional bullet voting, because a majority offering any support at all to another candidate can cause the majority's preferred choice to lose.
SRV also does not satisfy the majority criterion, but in a much less "severe" way than Approval and Score -- the majority has to offer support to two additional candidates in order for the majority's top choice to lose. This suggests a new criterion that makes more realistic sense for evaluating voting methods that balance competing criteria.
The Relaxed Majority Criterion:
A voting system passes the RMC if a majority faction of voters can express maximum support to a first choice, and a non-zero "maximum support - 1" to a second choice, and guarantee that their first choice wins.
IRV and SRV pass RMC, Score and Approval do not.